Constitutional Law--The First Amendment and Protest Boycotts:  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. by Covington, George Carruthers
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 62 | Number 2 Article 7
1-1-1984
Constitutional Law--The First Amendment and
Protest Boycotts: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co.
George Carruthers Covington
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




Constitutional Law-The First Amendment and Protest
Boycotts: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
The protest boycott' is a powerful weapon 2 that has helped advance the
goals of various interest groups3 throughout Colonial and American history.
Although, boycotts occurred even before the word itself had been coined,
4
courts' treatment of such activity is recent and varied.5 A major problem
courts experience in circumscribing protest boycott activity6 lies in the accept-
1. Throughout this note the term "protest boycott" will signify a boycott motivated by a
political, social, religious or other noncommercial purpose. See generally Bird, Sherman Act Limi-
tations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DuKE L.J. 247 (discussing the extent
to which the Sherman Act does or should impose restraints on protest boycotts and concluding
that noncommercial boycotts should be considered illegal per se, except in a few narrowly defined
situations); Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 1131 (1980)
(extensively discussing the preferability of the term "protest boycott" over other designations used
by earlier commentators).
2. Numerous examples illustrate the potential economic impact of boycott actions. A 1963
civil rights boycott of retail merchants in Birmingham, Alabama, for example, was estimated to
have cost the merchants as much as $750,000 a week in lost business. See TIME, June 7, 1963, at
95. A nationwide boycott of table grapes in 1968 resulted in a 12% decline in sales. See TIME,
July 4, 1969, at 16, 18.
3. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1979, at 2, col. 2 (refusal of dockworkers to unload Iranian
goods); N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1978, at 85, col. 4 (National Federation for Decency's call for boycott
of ABC-TV's "sleazy sex" programming); N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1978, at 20, col. 6 (church-group
support for consumer boycott of J.P. Stevens & Co.'s textiles in response to illegal, anti-union
practices); N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1977, at 16, col. 6 (California Ku Klux Klan plan to "help
whites" by boycotting business unfriendly to the Klan); N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1977, at 21, col. 4
(homosexual organization's boycott of Florida's citrus products in retaliation for anti-gay cam-
paign of Anita Bryant); N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1973 at 28, col. 2 (consumer boycott to protest high
meat prices).
4. The word boycott derives from the eponym Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott. As a
retired British army officer serving as an estate manager in Ireland, he refused, in 1880, to reduce
rents in response to demands by the Irish Land League and served writs of eviction on his tenants.
When, at the urging of Charles Parnell, an Irish nationalist leader, Boycott's tenants refused to
deal with him, the captain was obliged to import workers from Ulster to harvest his crops under
the guard of hundreds of soldiers. II ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 212 (15th ed. 1974).
5. Courts' attempts to restrict protest boycotts have followed several varied tacks, including
imposing tort and antitrust liability. Tort liability is usually framed in terms of malicious interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's business interests, as in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct.
3409 (1982), or an unlawful conspiracy to destroy plaintiff's business. Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference, Inc. v. A. G. Corp., 241 So. 2d 619 (Miss. 1970). See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 130 (4th ed. 1971). For a summary of the tort law as applied
to various political boycotts, see Comment, The tonsumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L.J. 226, 234-38
(1971); Note, The Common-Law and Constitutional Status of Anti-Discrimination Boycotts, 66
YALE L.J. 397, 398-402 (1957). Antitrust liability seems unlikely after the decision in Missouri v.
NOW, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980), in which the court plumbed
the legislative history of the Sherman Act and held that a protest boycott was outside the scope
and intent of the Act. Liability based on boycotts as illegal secondary pressure is assured only in
the labor union context. See Longshoremen v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
6. Boycott activity includes the various types of behavior that comprise a boycott. Typi-
cally, this activity includes an agreement among two or more people to initiate the boycott and use
the publicity their agreement generates to induce third parties to join in the effort. Methods used
to publicize a boycott vary widely, but usually include speeches, rallies, magazine and newspaper
notices, picketing, and word of mouth.
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ability of its most obvious component-the decision by an individual to take
his business where he pleases. Against this well-established free market bias,
courts must weigh the legitimate state concern that the boycott may be accom-
panied by economic distortion and financial blackmail. When faced with
these competing concerns in the past, the Supreme Court held that group boy-
cotts in a business setting were illegal per se.7
Recently, however, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 8 the Supreme
Court extended first amendment protection to political protest boycotts. Al-
though the decision legally endorses the historical acceptance protest boycotts
have enjoyed, several factors suggest that this potentially far reaching holding
was not the product of a great deal of judicial scrutiny. Specifically, the social
and historical backdrop to the case very nearly dictated its outcome and thus
discouraged serious examination of the conflicting interests at stake. 9
Had the Court faced the first amendment question in a different boycott
case it might have felt obligated to identify and weigh more carefully the diffi-
cult, conflicting interests involved. As it was, the hard facts of Ciaiborne may
have made the answer seem too clear, leading the Court to announce the kind
of broad protection that ultimately will demand extensive qualification.
The Claiborne boycott began in March 1966, when several influential
blacks in Claiborne County, Mississippi agreed to withhold their business
from a group of merchants doing business in the town of Port Gibson. To
encourage others in the community to join them, the organizers began picket-
ing the boycotted businesses, distributing leaflets, giving speeches and holding
rallies.10 Scattered acts of violence accompanied this peaceful activity."I The
violence was directed at shoppers who had ignored the boycott. No evidence,
however, linked the violence to the organizers.' 2
The nature of the demands that had prompted the effort reflected the state
7. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). All group boycotts con-
sidered by the Supreme Court prior to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409
(1982), had been conducted by business firms or associations of such firms. See, e.g., Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (membership exchange of broker-dealers in securi-
ties); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam)
(manufacturers of gas burners and utility companies); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945) (cooperative association of newspaper publishers); Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (association of women's garment manufacturers). See
also Bauer, Per Se lllegaliy of Concerted Refusals to Deal- A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79
COLUM. L. Rav. 685. It is clear that protest boycotts' de facto immunity to legal challenge has
receded as social and political activitists increasingly look to the marketplace as a forum for effec-
tive protest.
8. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
9. Id. at 3413-18. The detailed recitation of facts in the Claiborne opinion does not reveal
the extent to which the boycott damaged the merchants or the degree to which the merchants
could affect conditions that the boycotters wanted changed. Both considerations would be rele-
vant if the Court had thought that the facts demanded a balanced analysis.
10. Id at 3422-23.
11. Evidence at trial showed that supporters of the boycott had committed several acts of
violence against those who did not go along with the effort. These forms of discipline included
shooting at houses, knocking out car windows, slashing tires, as well as other forms of intimida-
tion. id. at 3421 n.37, 3422.
12. Id. at 3422.
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of race relations throughout the South in the mid-1960's. The blacks of Clai-
borne County did not demand hiring quotas or job training programs. They
sought the desegregation of public schools and facilities, the hiring of a black
policeman, and the selection of blacks for jury duty.13 They also requested
that police officers "no longer address Negroes by such terms as 'boy,' 'girl,'
'shine,' 'uncle,' or any other offensive term, but as 'Mr.,' 'Mrs.,' or 'Miss,' as is
the case with other citizens."' 14 The boycott persisted because, in the words of
one targeted merchant, "I thought that they were demanding too much too
quickly."' 15
The effectiveness of the boycott varied throughout its long duration.' 6
Some concessions led to a partial lift of the ban,17 but the murder of Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King in 1968 and the death of a young black man during an en-
counter with two Port Gibson police officers in 1969 renewed the boycott's
intensity. Finally, in October 1969 several targeted merchants filed suit. Many
of the merchants suffered serious economic harm'$-blacks represented just
over 70% of Claiborne County's population in the mid-1960's,' 9 and the boy-
cott received strong support at its height. Many of the merchants undoubtedly
complained that they had no control over the conditions that had motivated
the blacks to boycott, insisting that most of the changes sought could be ef-
fected only through the political process, to which everyone had equal access.
Anyone familiar with the political dynamics of a small southern town, how-
ever, might reasonably question this assertion.20 Certainly the blacks of Port
Gibson believed that economic pressure on targeted merchants would lead to
political pressure on town hall. Other civil rights boycotts had confirmed this
suspicion. 2' The boycotters also probably considered more traditional forms
of political expression as less effective. Throughout the South, those who con-
trolled cities and towns like Port Gibson had developed techniques of political
obstruction that had postponed for generations any social change that was
13. The demands of the petition are listed in full in the opinion of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, 393 So. 2d 1290, 1295-96 (Miss. 1980).
14. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3418-19.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
16. The boycott officially began with a voice vote in favor of the action by several hundred
blacks on April 1, 1966. Most accounts cite the filing of the lawsuit on October 31, 1969 as the
date the boycott ended. Id. at 3-8.
17. On February 1, 1967, Port Gibson employed its first black policeman. During that month,
the boycott was lifted on a number of merchants. See Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3420.
18. The chancellor found that twelve of the merchants had suffered an economic loss that
totaldd $944,699 over seven years. Id at 3415.
19. In the 1960 Census, blacks constituted 76% of the population of Claiborne County. See
UNITED STATES BURFA OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960 GENERAL POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS: Mississippi (1963).
20. For an excellent discussion of the political dynamics of a small southern town during this
period, see W. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1980).
21. The petition that preceded the boycott made reference to "selective buying campaigns"
that had been used with success in other communities and added that the black people of Port
Gibson hoped such tactics would not be necessary there. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3419. Perhaps
the most famous example of the many civil rights boycotts was the bus boycott begun by black
citizens of Montgomery, Alabama in 1955 to protest racial discrimination. See M. L. KING,
STRIDE TOWARDS FREEDOM (1958); N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1955, at 31, col. 2.
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viewed as "too much too quickly."22 The blacks of Port Gibson might have
recalled their fruitless attempts to use the traditional political methods and
concluded that they were still part of "a social order that had consistently
treated them as second class citizens."'23
In spite of these facts, after an eight month trial delayed for three and
one-half years24 by procedural maneuvering, the Mississippi Chancery Court
found the NAACP and 129 codefendants jointly and severally liable for
$1,250,699 in damages and attorneys' fees.25 The first and primary ground for
liability was defendants' involvement in a civil conspiracy to commit the com-
mon law tort of interference with the business of the merchants. 26 As a second
and alternative ground the chancellor found that defendants had organized an
unlawful secondary boycott.27 As another alternative ground the chancellor
found that the boycott had violated Mississippi's antitrust statute.28
On appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court found the entire boycott unlaw-
ful but on an entirely new theory. The court held that the defendants had
conspired to stage a boycott that was unlawful solely because it was violent.29
The court, however, found errors in the proof of damages and remanded for
retrial on that point alone.3 0
The Supreme Court of the United States was somewhat mystified by the
paucity of evidence on which the Mississippi Supreme Court might have based
its theory of liability. The Court noted that at trial the chancellor had made
no factual findings that the defendants had agreed or conspired to use force
and violence as a part of the boycott.3 1 Respondents attempted to clarify their
position by filing a supplemental brief that linked the petitioners to specific
acts of violence on the basis of their membership in one of three groups that
had managed and enforced the boycott.3 2 Thus, the conspiracy theory disap-
peared and repondents instead sought to base their action against petitioners
22. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. 3409.
23. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3425.
24. Commencement of the trial was delayed by collateral proceedings in federal court. See
Henry v. First Nat'l Bk., 50 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Miss. 1970), vacated, 444 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1019 (1972). The district court entered a preliminary injunction restraining
the chancery court proceedings, on the theory that the merchants "[sought] to impinge upon [the
boycotters'] First Amendment rights," and that "the prosecution of the State Action [would] have
[had] a chilling effect upon the exercise of those rights." Henry, 50 F.R.D. at 268. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit vacated, holding that merely commencing a private state tort suit had not itself in-
volved "state action" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Henry, 444 F.2d at 1312.
25. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. NAACP, No. 78,353 (Miss. Chancery Ct. filed Aug. 9, 1976),
reprinted in Appendices to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 68b, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. 3409.
26. Id., reprinted in Appendices to Petition for Writ of Certiorai at 68b, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct.
3409. The elements of the tort include intentional "malicious" interference and resulting damage.
See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §130 at 953-54 (4th ed. 1971).
27. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. NAACP, No. 78,353 (Miss. Chancery Ct. filed Aug. 9, 1976),
reprinted in Appendices to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 44b-53b, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. 3409.
28. Id., reprinted in Appendices to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 53b-57b, Claiborne, 102
S. Ct. 3409; Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1972).
29. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1311 (Miss. 1980).
30. Id at 1304-07.
31. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3417.
32. Id. at 3417-18.
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on some form of vicarious liability resulting from management of and involve-
ment in a violent boycott. In attempting to determine the first amendment
significance of Claiborne, it is important to note that the merchants never ar-
gued before any court that a tightly organized political protest boycott without
violence could create liability for its organizers. As a result, the Claiborne deci-
sion was primarily concerned with the adequacy of the evidence that tied the
organizers of the boycott to the indisputably illegal, violent incidents that had
occured.
The Court found that the respondents had failed to link the violent activ-
ity to any of the named defendants, including the NAACP, and, in addition,
that no logical relation existed between the damages awarded and any eco-
nomic harm that had resulted exclusively from such violent boycott activity.33
The Court also rejected the notion that isolated violent acts by individuals
involved in the boycott could taint the entire effort and thereby subject all
involved to liability.34
The Court did extend first amendment protection to the peaceful activity
that made up the boycott in Claiborne,35 but the analysis it used to reach that
holding was somewhat sketchy, probably because the merchants never made
the issue a part of their case. The Court extended first amendment protection
to the peaceful aspects of the boycott only to set the stage for a rigid examina-
tion of the evidence linking petitioners to the illegal violent activity.3 6 Since
the overall boycott created a backdrop of constitutionally protected behavior
the Court could more easily justify its holding that the findings of the Missis-
sippi court were not adequately supported by the evidence. This indirect sig-
nificance of first amendment protection coupled with the compelling facts of
the case perhaps best explain the Court's lack of analysis in deciding this con-
stitutional issue.
The Court did offer two arguments for extending first amendment protec-
tion to the Port Gibson boycott. First, it determined, by labeling rather than
analyzing, that the boycott was political, rather than economic, activity and
thus not readily subject to governmental regulation.3 7 Second, the Court com-
pared the protest boycott in Claiborne to the direct political petitioning present
in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 38 In
Noerr, the Court had extended first amendment protection to direct political
petitioning despite the anticompetitive effect of such petitioning.39
33. Id. at 3431.
34. Id. at 3432.
35. Id. at 3427.
36. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3427.
37. Id.
38. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). For a general discussion of the Noerr decision, see Fischel,Antitrust
Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action; the Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pen-
nington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80 (1977); Note, The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine--
Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 57 CALIF. L. REv. 518 (1969).
39. The so-called "doctrine" that emerged from Noerr, and its successor U.M.W. v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), is often referred to as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Noerr-
Pennington doctrine originally applied to direct petitioning for governmental action. That activity
19841
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The Court prefaced its political label of the boycott with a discussion of
the traditional first amendment conduct that had permeated the entire effort.
40
Such highly protected activities as public speaking, pamphleteering, associa-
tion and petitioning were conspicuous components of this boycott. 41 The
Court acknowledged, however, that the presence of protected activity alone
was not determinative. It alluded to a countervailing argument by noting the
long-standing recognition of "strong governmental interest in certain forms of
economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental ef-
fect on rights of speech and association." 42 The Court identified union picket-
ing, labor boycotts, and antitrust associations as examples of activities in
which the governmental interest in regulating economic affairs traditionally
has outweighed such regulation's "incidental" infringement on activity other-
wise protected by the first amendment.43
The Court declined, however, to take the next step of setting out and bal-
ancing the conflicting first amendment and economic interests that were at
stake in the Claiborne boycott. The Court instead stated flatly that the lower
courts had attempted to regulate petitioners' "peaceful political activity" 44 and
that the State had less authority in this context than when regulating "eco-
nomic activity."' 45 The problem, of course, is that protest boycotts and all the
activity mentioned by the court-secondary labor boycotts, union picketing
and antitrust activity-might involve conduct that could be viewed as both
"peaceful political activity" and "economic activity." 46
was protected even when it was part of a broader scheme that violated the Sherman Act. The
doctrine has protected even unethical or illegal methods of exerting influence directly on govern-
ment officials. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 140 (1961) (propaganda deliberately made to appear as "spontaneous declarations of
independent groups"); Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978)
(coercion and false statements); Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp.
696 (D. Colo. 1975) (illegal contributions and bribes). Courts have cautioned that they will scru-
tinze alleged petitionary activity to assure that it actually seeks government action, and is not
merely an attempt to achieve a commercial advantage directly, without any governmental action
The application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to protest boycotts, which began with Missouri
v. NOW, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980) and is continued in Claiborne, marks the only appli-
cation of Noerr to activity that sought only to influence governmental action indirectly by putting
economic pressure on nongovernmental targets. For general discussion of the scope of Noerr
prior to its application to boycotts, see Fischel, supra note 38; Holzer, An Analysisfor Reconcilingu
the Antitrust Laws with the Right to Petition: Noerr-Pennington in Light of Cantor v. Detroit
Edison, 27 EMORY LJ. 673 (1978); Note, Application ofthe Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence
Government Action, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 847 (1968).
40. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3423.
41. Id
42. Id. at 3425.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3426.
45. Id.
46. In International Longshoremen's Assoc. v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982), the
Court faced such mixed activity. The boycotters in International Longshoremen's Assoc. were
members of a labor union and, in protest of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, refused to handle
cargo destined to or coming from the Soviet Union. The Court noted the mixed nature of the
activity by holding that, although the union was involved in peaceful political activity, such activ-
ity had a ruinous economic effect on an innocent third party. The Court held that such protest
boycott activity, by a labor union, was not protected by the first amendment. Id at 224-25. The
Court did at least acknowledge that the facts might call for a balancing of interests had not the
[Vol. 62
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To reveal more clearly the conflicting issues, another court addressing
protest boycotts will have to scrutinize and balance the degree to which at-
tempted governmental regulation interferes with first amendment activity.47
A court also will have to determine the true purpose of the boycott and then
decide if that purpose justified the economic harm caused. No court likes to
make these difficult determinations. They are usually heavily dependent on
the facts and are highly resistant to an analysis that can be used with an eye to
future cases.48 The exercise, however, is not without value. Principles for fu-
ture cases would emerge if a court acknowledged that both political and eco-
nomic behavior are typically present in a protest boycott case, and then
decided which behavior was more significant.
The Court in Claiborne did not take this step, because it was not address-
ing the typical protest boycott. Instead it faced a group of boycotters who had
carried a great deal of emotional, legal, and historical baggage into the court-
room. The Claiborne Court's placement of a "political" tag on activity with
both political and economic effects was one way of saying that the political
goals of the Port Gibson boycott justified the resulting economic harm to the
town's merchants. Other than the merchants, few would quibble with the re-
sult. The Court arrived there, however, by using a shorthand form that
yielded an incomplete analysis.
The abbreviated analysis discussed above will not mislead the courts in
future cases; it simply will not lead them at all. The second argument in Clai-
borne for extending first amendment protection to the boycott is more prob-
lematic. The Court cited Noerr to support the proposition that the Port
Gibson boycott was a form of petitioning, which the states may not regulate,
even though the boycott had caused the merchants economic harm.49 Aside
from granting what was earlier ignored-that boycotts include economic as
well as political conduct---this analogy to Noerr could create problems for the
courts.
In Noerr plaintiffs were in the trucking business and had sought to enjoin
defendants, a lobbying group for the railroads, from directly petitioning the
legislature for laws that would have harmed the truckers and allegedly re-
duced competition in the transportation industry.50 The Noerr decision cre-
ated a narrow first amendment exception to the antitrust laws by allowing
representatives of one group within an industry to petition the legislature for
regulations that would confer some economic advantage on the petitioning
labor laws, which governed the behavior, already reflected in statutory form the balancing of the
interests of labor and management. Id at 226.
47. This is the approach advocated in an often cited student note on the subject. See Note,
Political Bojcott Activi y and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1978).
48. Justice Brennan warned against the hazards of such determinations in his concurring
opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Seesupra notes 98-99 and accom-
panying text.
49. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
50. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129
(1961).
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party while possibly reducing competition in that industry.5 ' Courts have sub-
sequently applied the Noerr doctrine to concerted publicity directed at the leg-
islature even when the desired legislation would actually produce otherwise
illegal anticompetitive results. 52 The potential end-reducing competition-
does not taint the highly protected means-petitioning the government. The
exception should be clear cut-if a party is engaged in direct petitioning of the
legislature, there exists virtual per se protection for the efforts, regardless of the
results that might follow if the legislation is passed. The Noerr doctrine em-
bodies than a common sense recognition that the legislative branch must be
entrusted to hear both sides and determine for itself whether to act upon or
ignore a message.
In Missouri v. NOW, Inc. 53 the Eighth Circuit extended the Noerr doc-
trine to a less direct form of petitioning, the protest boycott. In that case the
National Organization for Women (NOW) called for a convention boycott of
the hotel industry in Missouri to pressure that state's legislature into passing
the Equal Rights Amendment. The court held that the boycott was protected,
relying primarily on the Noerr doctrine.54 The dissent emphasized the inap-
propriateness of forcing protest boycotts into the Noerr line of cases simply
because the boycotters ultimately hoped to effect legislative action,55 and ar-
gued persuasively that the majority in NOW applied the converse of the Noerr
holding.56 In NOW the highly protected end-petitioning the legislature-
was used to insulate from prosecution the means-a conspiracy to restrain
trade. Or as the State argued: "The Noerr case was a combination to get
legislation harmful to others. The NOW case is a combination to harm others
to get legislation." 5
7
The Court in Claiborne compared the admirable goals of the boycotters in
that case to the less than admirable goals of the defendants in Noerr and found
that the distinction made Claiborne an easier decision than Noerr.58 This dis-
tinction misses the point. In Noerr the defendants were directly petitioning the
government, and this activity was protected regardless of the goals.5 9 Had the
railroad defendants in Noerr organized a boycott of the trucking industry to
last until the legislature passed laws advantageous to the railroaders, a com-
parison of the two cases would perhaps have been helpful. It is difficult to
believe, however, that the Court would protect every group of boycotters that
could claim as its ultimate purpose an intention to influence legislation. It is
not likely, for example, that any court would have protected a boycott of
Chrysler organized by General Motors with the ostensible purpose of petition-
51. Id at 136-38.
52. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
53. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
54. Id at 1311-16.
55. Id. at 1319-26 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 1323.
57. Id.
58. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3426.




ing Congress to revoke the "bail-out" of that company. No matter how Gen-
eral Motors urged that it was simply engaged in Noerr-type petitioning, the
effort would be tainted by the competitive advantage General Motors stood to
gain. It is equally unlikely that protest boycotters without any professed inten-
tion to influence legislation are always subject to stricter regulation because
they do not fit into the Noerr line of cases. It would be absurd, for example, to
protect Jesse Jackson's boycott of Anheuser Busch6° only if the boycott's an-
nounced goal was to procure legislation forcing that company to employ more
blacks, but not to protect the activity if the goal was to pressure the company
to take such action itself. If the Noerr exception is taken as the actual basis of
the Claiborne decision and followed to its logical conclusion, virtually any
protest boycott that claimed to seek legislative action would enjoy at least a
strong presumption of legality, while other protest boycotts that do not seek
legislation, either directly or indirectly, would be relegated to some separate
category. Any organizers.could claim Noerr protection by characterizing their
efforts as indirect attempts to petition the legislature for a law giving the
boycotters the results they sought. It is doubtful that the Court intended such
a reading for Claiborne.
The objectives of the Port Gibson boycott significantly affected the Clai-
borne decision,61 but casting those objectives as attempts ultimately to petition
the legislature does not add much to their significance. It was the important
objective of racial equaity62 that probably persuaded the Court that protect-
ing the boycott was more important than protecting the merchants.
Given also the compelling facts and significant presence of first amend-
ment activity in Claiborne,63 the Court's decision to extend first amendment
protection to the Port Gibson boycott seems obvious. Unfortunately, the deci-
sion does not offer much direction to courts in future cases that are confronted
with parties and facts that do not similarly point to one answer. The opinion's
reliance on the Noerr decision is also of little help since that decision can only
be applied with any precision to situations involving direct petitioning of the
government.
Undoubtedly, there will be more difficult cases. The state's interest is a
strong one-a fact not adequately revealed by the facts of Claiborne. Fre-
quently, a protest boycott financially destroys its targets because the political
process or other factors (over which the targets may have little or no control)
do not respond to the boycotters' demands. For example, it is unlikely that
American businessmen supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or held
great sway over the Soviet Politburo, yet certain American businesses suffered
great economic harm when longshoremen, protesting the invasion of Afghani-
stan, boycotted the handling of cargo arriving from or destined for the Soviet
60. Ross, PUSH Collides with Busch, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1982, at 90.
61. See Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3425-26.
62. See id at 3425.
63. Id
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Union.64 Arab nations have attempted (largely unsuccessfully) to boycott
American businesses that trade with Israel in hopes of bringing about every-
thing from Palestinian autonomy to Israel's extinction. 65
On the other hand, individuals from the American Revolution to the civil
rights struggle of the 1960s, 66 have used the protest boycott as one of the most
effective tactics to apply pressure where it hurts (the pocketbook), and thus
hasten needed social change. It is doubtful that the courts can ever devise a
precise, categorical formula for testing the legality of a protest boycott, no
matter how desirable such precision might be. The goals, the parties, the
methods, and the harm of the individual boycotts vary too much. Targets of
boycotts will continue to call on the courts, however, to provide relief from
what they will always view as an unjust (hence illegal) boycott.
The parties to the next protest boycott case are easily imagined. Take a
hypothetical company involved in some form of activity that is legal but objec-
tionable to some group of hypothetical defendants. The company could have,
for example, extensive investments in South Africa, all perfectly legitimate.
The defendants-to-be agree to withhold business from both the company and
several of its highly visible major customers. In addition, they agree to mount
a massive publicity campaign to bring attention to their decision and to urge
all like-minded citizens to join in their refusal to deal. The targeted company
then responds with a suit under common law tort theories of conspiracy to
interfere with business relations and inducement of third parties not to deal.67
It is difficult to envision how even a strained Noerr analysis could apply
to these facts. There is no attempt to obtain legislation, even indirectly. Still,
the behavior appears quite similar to that found in NOW and Claiborne. In
fact, this strong similarity suggests that a future boycott of this sort would be
subject to similar treatment in spite of the absence of any form of petitioning
by the boycotters.
In United States v. O'Brien,68 however, the Supreme Court suggested a
suitable "test" that could be applied. This test was suggested for analyzing the
constitutionality of attempts to regulate conduct that combines "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements, such as boycotts. 69 The Court stated the test as
follows:
[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if [1] it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
64. See supra note 46.
65. See, e.g., Note, The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of United States v. Bechtel in
Light of the Export Administration Amendments of1977, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1440, 1446 (1979).
66. See supra note 21.
67. See generaly, W. PROssER, supra note 5, at § 130.
68. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
69. Id. at 376.
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greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 70
In order to apply O'Brien to protest boycotts, it is helpful to break down
the activity into the two components suggested in the hypothetical that are
inherent in almost any boycott. Virtually all protest boycotts will consist of a
group of persons agreeing to boycott (concerted refusals to deal).7 1 That same
group will also urge others to follow their lead (inducement of third parties).72
Indeed, the lower courts in Claiborne found that the Port Gibson boycott con-
tained both of these elements. 73 One student commentator, in a frequently
cited note,74 has discussed the application of the O'Brien test to hypothetical
attempts to regulate protest boycotts, concluding that the first amendment pro-
tects the inducements of third parties but not concerted refusals to deal.75 This
conflicts with the holding in Claiborne that all nonviolent elements in the Port
Gibson boycott are entitled to first amendment protection.76 It is worthwhile,
then, to explore how O'Brien applies to concerted refusals to deal and induce-
ments of third parties in order to shed some light on the considerations in-
volved in extending first amendment protection to both.
The inducement of third parties is the component of a boycott that most
clearly involves the exercise of free speech.7 7 Any regulation that attempts to
limit methods of persuasion, such as speeches, picketing, and other publicity
employed in the typical boycott, would create the greatest risk of violating the
first amendment. Applying the O'Brien test to such a regulation would help
isolate the first amendment problem despite the gratuitous nature of the test's
first two criteria. Criterion one begs the question by demanding the regulation
be constitutional, which is exactly what the overall test is supposed to deter-
mine. Criterion two requires that a "substantial" governmental concern
prompt the regulation. This requirement has a certain self-fulfilling quality
since almost any legal question exposed to judicial scrutiny tends to take on
significance as a result. Moreover, the flexibility of the term "substantial" does
not help advance the analysis. It is the third criterion that forces scrutiny of
the challenged behavior and reveals the ultimate effect of attempts to regulate
the publicity component of a protest boycott. Simply put, the question is this:
Is the concern unrelated to the suppression of free expression? A relaxed ap-
plication of this requirement would screen out very little--the government
70. Id. at 377.
71. See, e.g., Ferdinand Harmm Brewing Co. v. Pelinder, 97 Mo. App. 64, 69-70,71 S.W. 691,
692-93 (1903); Finnegan v. Butler, 112 Misc. 280, 182 N.Y.S. 671 (Sup. Ct. 1920); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 765 (1939).
72. See, e.g., Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N.W. 482 (1913);
Graham v. St. Charles R.R., 47 La. Ann. 214, 16 So. 806 (1895); Tuttle v. Burch, 107 Minn. 145,
119 N.W. 946 (1909); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939).
73. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. NAACP, No. 78,353 (Miss. Chancery Ct. filed Aug. 9, 1976),
reprinted in Appendices to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 38b, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. 3409.
74. Note, supra note 47. This note was cited in Missouri v. NOW, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1324
n.16; Brief for Petitioner at 24, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. 3409.
75. Note, supra note 47, at 687-91.
76. Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3427.
77. The Court found that the inducement of third parties in Claiborne involved clear first
amendment activity such as giving speeches, picketing, and associating. Id. at 3424.
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would rarely justify restrictions on speech in terms that are clearly related to
the suppression of that speech's message. Unless the inducement of third par-
ties involved exceptional categories that are outside the first amendment, 78 the
government could not refuse to protect boycott publicity by explaining that it
did not approve of the message. 79 Instead, the government probably would
refer to some other concern. Most typically, the government's concern would
be to avoid the distortion of pure market decisions or, put another way, to
protect pure economic competition. Of course, this concern is implicated only
if the message used to induce third parties is persuasive to an individual decid-
ing whether to purchase. Our hypothetical company is always free to counter
the campaign with one of its own justifying its South African investments.80
The public can then make up their own minds. For that matter, the company
can ignore the campaign and trust that the public will not care where they
invest their money as long as they have a good product.
Whatever the consumer decides, it is important to emphasize that the gov-
ernment's concern does not exist unless the public is receptive to and acts upon
the message. By comparison, the O'Brien case offered an example of a govern-
mental concern that did not depend on the widespread acceptance of the com-
municator's ideas. The defendant in O'Brien had burned his draft card.8 ' The
government justified the prohibition of such activity by advancing a plausible
concern that the activity would prevent the government from keeping accurate
selective service records. The concern was valid no matter how the communi-
cation had affected the public. 82 Even if O'Brien had burned his card in the
privacy of his bedroom, the government could claim that the activity had dis-
rupted the record keeping procedure. Such is not the case, however, with any
regulation that would proscribe the publicity component of a protest boycott.
For this reason, application of O'Brien would render any such regulation
unconstitutional.
Regulation of concerted refusals to deal prompts a different analysis.8 3
The governmental interest motivating any such regulation would be the
same-the protection of competition. The regulation addressing concerted re-
78. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not constitutionally
protected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words"); Schenk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); ("clear and present danger").
79. Such content based regulations regularly are held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Consoli-
dated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (a New York Public Service Com-
mission order prohibiting Consolidated Edision from inserting leaflettes discussing controversial
issues of public policy into its monthly bills was an impermissible content-based regulation of
speech).
80. This "more speech" or "marketplace of ideas" approach depends on the assumption that
truth and falsehood wrestle "in a free and open encounter." See Milton, Areopagetica, A Speech
for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the Parliament of England (1644), in PROSE WRITINGS
23-38 (Everyman, ed. 1927). This "marketplace of ideas" justification for free speech begins to
break down as those with money better utilize mass communication to assure that their ideas are
marketed more successfully. See L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTIstrTONAL LAw, 576-77 (1978).
81. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
82. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Catagorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
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fusals to deal, however, would meet criterion three of O'Brien. Such conduct
reduces competition regardless of its symbolic significance or expressive value.
Unlike inducement of third parties, which triggers the governmental interest
only if the public is receptive,84 concerted refusals to deal, by their very na-
ture, trigger the governmental interest. The government is concerned about
concerted refusals to deal that occur in absolute secrecy as well as those that
are publicized as part of a highly visible protest boycott.
Clearing the third criterion of O'Brien shifts consideration to the fourth:
"[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified. . . if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest."85 Professor John Hart Ely has pointed out
that the Supreme Court has taken two separate approaches in applying this
"least restrictive alternative" analysis.86 One method would look to see that
there is no "gratuitous inhibition of expression. 87 As long as the regulation in
question actually furthered the stated governmental purpose, it is valid, re-
gardless of the cost to first amendment freedoms.
If a general prohibition of all concerted refusals to deal serves to limit
even slightly the disruptive effect of boycotts on competition, then the prohibi-
tion is constitutional under this approach. Obviously this involves no real bal-
ancing and excludes virtually nothing. The real question should be whether
the increment of protection gained through a regulation justifies the corre-
sponding loss of "incidental" first amendment freedoms.88 A narrower regula-
tion may be more difficult to implement, but as Professor Ely has noted, a
better fit will always cost more.89
In the context of a boycott, this second approach would demand that a
general regulation against concerted refusals to deal be so necessary to the
preservation of competition that it justify the degree to which it restricts first
amendment freedoms. The first half of this equation clearly indicates that a
general prohibition of all concerted refusals to deal could aid competition in
certain circumstances. It is well documented that such conduct, in the context
of a protest boycott, can ruin a merchant who otherwise provides a healthy
market force.90 Allowing refusals to deal could also aid competition. Con-
sumers constantly band together and refuse to deal with a merchant who
overcharges them, until he makes his prices competitive with the rest of the
market.91 Thus, a general prohibition of refusals to deal would probably aid
competition, but not in every instance.
84. See supra text accompanying note 80.
85. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
86. See Ely, supra note 82.
87. Id. at 1485.
88. Ely, supra note 82, at 1486-87.
89. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723,
729 (1974).
90. See supra note 2.
91. See, e.g., Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250 (1934) (upheld
right to picket to protest high prices); N.Y. Times, March 17, 1973, at 28, col. 2 (consumer boycott
to protest high meat prices).
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The companion question requires determining the degree to which such a
prohibition would incidentally infringe on first amendment freedoms.92 In the
context of protest boycotts, the prohibition of concerted refusals to deal is tan-
tamount to prohibiting the right to boycott itself. Realistically, in any protest
boycott a group of true believers or organizers will make an agreement (usu-
ally provable)93 to refuse to deal with a certain group of buyers or sellers. In
Claiborne the Court described a rather large concerted refusal to deal-"at a
local NAACP meeting at the First Baptist Church, several hundred black per-
sons voted to place a boycott on white merchants in the area."' 94 Anyone in-
terested in breaking a boycott would have an extremely powerful means of
doing so if he or she could press charges against the organizers based on their
participation in the initial agreement. It is possible to imagine that a group of
organizers could agree only to urge third parties to withhold their business, as
opposed to the organizers' agreeing to withhold their own business. It is more
probable, however, that such distinctions exist only in the minds of lawyers.
Once the organizers are liable, even if only for provable damages result-
ing from their agreement, the boycott is broken. "Several hundred black per-
sons" agreed to the concerted refusal to deal in Port Gibson.95 Potential
liability for the organizers (even if only for their percentage of the total effect)
could have been used effectively to discourage, or more likely, prevent, the
entire effort. In practical application, then, recognizing a state's power to pro-
scribe agreements to engage in protest boycotts would result in the elimination
of such boycotts altogether.
This conclusion argues strongly against any state prohibition of concerted
refusals to deal that are a part of a protest boycott. Using the analysis sug-
gested by the fourth criterion of O'Brien, the increment of increased protection
of competition gained by such a prohibition would not justify the degree to
which the prohibition would incidentally eliminate the exercise of the first
amendment activities present in a protest boycott.
Obviously, the state still must be able to prohibit concerted refusals to
deal in contexts other than protest boycotts. The first amendment can give
quite a lot in the face of the economic havoc that would result if any party had
the unbridled freedom to engage in any kind of concerted refusal to deal.96
The antitrust laws are the most obvious example of society's recognition that
the freedom to buy and sell as one pleases is not even close to absolute.97
There is always the danger that certain parties will attempt to gain protection
for anticompetitive behavior by claiming they are involved in a legitimate pro-
92. See supra note 88.
93. See Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3419.
94. Id. at 3413.
95. Id
96. The most recent example of this accommodation is International Longshoremen's Assoc.
v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982). See supra note 46.
97. See, e.g., Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920)
(upholding application of Sherman Act to boycott of pro-German publisher); State v. Horsemen's
Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 55 A.D.2d 251, 389 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1976) (upholding in dictum the
application of state antitrust law to boycott of horse racing).
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test boycott. Parties that stand to gain economically from such a boycott could
instigate the activity and then invoke the first amendment when their competi-
tors sought aid from the courts. The court in such an instance would have to
scrutinize the boycotter's real purpose. Justice Brennan recently pointed out,
in his concurrence in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,98 the dangers of basing
first amendment protection on the purpose of the defendant's speech.99 The
regulation involved in that case attempted to prohibit "commercial billboards"
in San Diego while allowing "noncommercial ones." ° Brennan warned, "I
have no doubt that those who seek to convey commercial messages will engage
in the most imaginative of exercises to place themselves within the safe haven
of noncommercial speech, while at the same time conveying their commercial
message." 10' 1 The same opportunity obviously exists for those who may wish
to place themselves within the safe haven of a protest boycott while at the
same time gaining some economic advantage.
Why then should the Supreme Court be willing to enter onto such slip-
pery ground in order to protect protest boycotts? The answer lies in the
unique place such activity holds in American history. It is perhaps significant
that Lloyd Cutler, counsel for the petitioners in Claiborne, spent the better part
of his oral argument attempting to place the Port Gibson boycott in the main-
stream of a venerable American political tradition.10 2 As is well known, dur-
ing the period between the Seven Years War and the American Revolution,
British Colonials signed agreements refusing to trade with the English
merchants in protest of certain British policies. ' 0 3 Those concerted refusals to
deal were not the exclusive device of a Sam Adams or Tom Paine-those on
the more radical fringe of the Revolution. Washington, Jefferson, Adams and
numerous other "unassailables" were also party to the agreements. 1°4 Histo-
rian Arthur Schlesinger has concluded that "the parties to the boycott agree-
ments thought them to be sound constitutional modes of relief."1 05 It is, then,
inherently implausible that individuals who used concerted refusals to deal to
effectuate their political purposes would enact a constitution that failed to pre-
serve that right for the future. More recently, Dr. Martin Luther King's use of
the protest boycott during the Civil Rights movement'0 6 further helped to es-
98. 453 U.S. 490, 521 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. Id at 538.
100. 453 U.S. at 493 n.1.
101. Id. at 540 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. See Brief for Petitioners at 18-23, Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. 3409.
103. These policies included the Stamp Act, which required affixing revenue stamps to certain
documents, the Townshend Acts, which imposed duties on glass, lead, paint, paper, and tea im-
ported into the colonies, and the Tea Act which granted the East India Company a tea monopoly
in the colonies and empowered it to deal directly with colonial retailers, thus depriving many
American merchant middlement of a profitable line of business. See, e.g., C. ANDREWS, THE
BOSTON MERCHANTS AND THE NON-IMPORTATION MOVEMENT, 40-43 (1968); A. SCHLESINGER,
THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 76-83 (1938).
104. J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON: THE FORGE OF EXPERIENCE (1732-1775) 311-14,
324-28 (1965); D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 137 (1948); A. SCHLESINGER, supra note
103, at 416.
105. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 103, at 96.
106. See supra note 21.
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tablish the special legitimacy of such activity.
As Justice Brennan predicted in Metromedia, 107 there will be numerous
groups who may wish to cloak a commercial purpose with a noncommercial
appearance. Because of the historical acceptance of protest boycotts, however,
the Court seems willing to risk such imposters in order to protect this distinct
and effective method for expressing social concerns.
The Claiborne opinion was proof of this willingness but the Court's anal-
ysis did little to resolve the strong conflicting interests that might be involved
in a more typical case. The reliance on Noerr creates a potentially strong legal
argument for imposters who might wish to advance their economic interests
under the protected guise of a protest boycott. Virtually any boycott organizer
could fashion an indirect, legislative petitioning purpose for a boycott that di-
rectly damaged another party. Rather then focus on the petitioning question,
subsequent courts would do better to acknowledge the mixture of economic
and political activity in a protest boycott and determine the degree to which
each was present in the case at hand. One premise of this note is that, no
mattter how strong the economic interest, the first amendment protects both
concerted refusals to deal and inducements of third parties that are part of a
bona fide protest boycott.' 08 A court faced with exceptional circumstances
may decide differently. 109 Whatever the future decisions might hold, however,
the O'Brien test provides the suitable analytical framework for such cases.
GEORGE CARRUTHERS COVINGTON
107. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 540 (Brennan, J., concurring).
108. A bona fide protest boycott is one that has clear noncommercial purposes. See supra note
1. This preliminary determination is crucial and might present difficult problems of proof. A
plaintiff attempting to negate such a defense is not without means, however. Business records and
market analysis would readily reveal significant shifts in buying habits that were beneficial to the
organizers of an alleged protest boycott. Insignificant shifts, on the other hand, would not often
prompt a lawsuit.
109. The most easily imaginable "exceptional" case involves a protest boycott that causes
drastic economic damage while only marginally advancing its purported noneconcomic goal. The
potential for such a boycott, if promoted truthfully, seems slight. Few would change well-estab.
lished buying patterns in order to pressure a party that had no control over or a relation with the
subject matter spurring a boycott. No matter how people responded to such truthful publicity,
however, the first amendment should represent our societies confidence that the public is suffi-
ciently intelligent to hear the message and act as it sees fit.
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